Individuals
Professor Cynthia Macdonald
Prof. - Philosophy and Religious Studies - University of Canterbury
| Telephone: | 364-2599 |
|---|---|
| Address: | Private Bag 4800 Christchurch 8020 |
Research Interests:
Philosophy
Cognitive science.Metaphysics.Philosophy of mind.Self-knowledge.Publications:
I: BOOKS:A. Books (sole author):
1. Mind-Body Identity Theories (London: Routledge, 1989). Pp. xiii + 255.
Paperback edition: January, 1992, in Great Britain and in the U.S.A.
2. Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, forthcoming April 2005)
Manuscript completed and with the Press.
B. Books Edited:
1. Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume One, ed. by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1995). Pp. xv + 495.
2. Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume Two, ed. by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, March, 1995). Pp. xii + 425.
3. Knowing Our Own Minds, ed. by Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998). Pp. x + 450.
Paperback edition: 2000. Oxford Scholarship Online edition: 2003.
4. Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, ed. by Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998). Pp. xii + 469.
II: PAPERS:
• ‘On the Unifier-Multiplier Controversy’, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, no. 4 (December, 1978), pp. 707-713.
• ‘Can Events Change?’, Philosophia, Vol. 9, nos. 3-4 (July, 1981), pp. 317-329.
• ‘Psychologism and Proper Names: Dummett vs. McDowell’, Explorations in Knowledge, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1984), pp. 13-21.
• ‘Mind-Body Identity and the Subjects of Events’, Philosophical Studies 48 (1985), pp. 73-81.
• ‘Constitutive Properties, Essences, and Events’, Philosophia, Vol. 16, no. 1 (April, 1986), pp. 29-43.
• ‘Mental Causes and Explanation of Action’ (with Graham Macdonald), Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 143 (1986), pp. 145-158.
Awarded joint first in a competition organized by The Philosophical Quarterly, 1985.
Reprinted in L. Stevenson, R. Squires, and J. Haldane, eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Translated and reprinted in G Zinmin and C. Zhaohua, eds., The Philosophy of Mind (China: Shangwu Publishing House, 2003), pp. 983-1004.
• ‘Mind, Meaning, and Assertion’, critical discussion of A. Appiah's Assertion and Conditionals, in Philosophical Books, Vol. XXVII, no. 4 (October, 1987), pp. 193-199.
• ‘Weak Externalism and Mind-Body Identity’, Mind, Vol. XCIX, no. 395 (July, 1990), pp. 387-405.
• ‘Nativism, Naturalism, and Evolutionary Theory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXIV (July, 1990), pp. 81-93.
• ‘Mental Causation and Non-Reductive Monism’ (with Graham Macdonald), Analysis, Vol. 51, no. 1 (October, 1990), pp. 23-32.
• ‘Psychophysical Type-Type Reduction Via Disjunction’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXX, no. 1 (April, 1992), pp. 65-69.
• ‘Weak Externalism and Psychological Reduction’, in K. Lennon and D. Charles, eds., Reduction, Explanation, and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 133-154.
• ‘Externalism and First-Person Authority’, Synthese, Vol. 104 (1995), pp. 99- 122.
• ‘Anti-individualism and Psychological Explanation’, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume One (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 156-172.
• ‘How to Be Psychologically Relevant’ (with Graham Macdonald), in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume One (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 60- 77.
• ‘Supervenient Causation’ (with Graham Macdonald), in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume One (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 4-27.
• ‘Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion’ (with Graham Macdonald), in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume One (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 86- 106.
• ‘Classicism vs. Connectionism’, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume Two (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 3-27.
• ‘Connectionism and Eliminativism’, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume Two (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 293-310.
• ‘Supervenience, Dependency, and Reduction’, in U. Yalcin and E. Savellos, eds., Supervenience: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 140-157.
• ‘Mind and Nature’, Inaugural Public Lecture delivered on appointment to the Belle van Zuylen Visiting Professorship in Philosophy (Utrecht: University of Utrecht Press, 1996), pp 1-17.
• ‘Connectionism and Eliminativism: Reply to Mills’, in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1997), pp. 316-322.
• ‘Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye’’, Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 83-106.
• ‘Externalism and Norms’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 273-301.
• ‘Tropes and Other Things’, in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald, eds., Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998), pp. 329-350.
• ‘Introduction’ (with Stephen Laurence), in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald, eds., Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998), pp. 1-7.
• ‘Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge’, in C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 123-154.
• ‘Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59 (1999), pp. 711-738.
• ‘Theories of Mind and the “Commonsense View”’, Mind and Language Vol. 17 (2002), pp. 467-488.
• ‘Self-Knowledge and the First Person’, in M. Sie, M. Slors, and B. Van den Brink, eds., Reasons of One’s Own (Sussex: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 171-191.
• ‘Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts’, Nous 38, no. 3 (September, 2004), pp. 503-524.
• ‘Real Metaphysics and the Descriptive/Revisionary Distinction’, in C. de Waal, ed., The Philosopher Replies to Critics, on the work of Susan Haack (New York: Prometheus Books Publishers, Inc., in Press for publication Autumn, 2004).
• ‘Reasons and Inner Space’, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., McDowell and His Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming 2005).
Encyclopedia Entries:
• ‘Anomalous Monism’, in D. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supplement (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 28-29.
• ‘Physicalism, Materialism’, in D. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supplement (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 446-448.
• ‘Physicalism, Materialism’, revised and expanded, in D. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, Second Edition (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan Publishing Company), forthcoming, 2005.
Reviews (Selected):
• Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action, in Mind, Vol. LXXXIX, no. 355 (July, 1980), pp. 469-472.
• D. Millican, Reasoning and the Explanation of Action, in Mind, Vol XCII (1983), pp. 624-626.
• J.E. Tiles, Things That Happen, in Mind, Vol. XCIII, no. 370 (April, 1984), pp. 308-311.
• B. Taylor, Modes of Occurrence, and B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka, eds., Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, in Mind, Vol. XCIV, no. 376 (October, 1985), pp. 632-637.
• J. Pollock, How to Build a Person, in The Times Literary Supplement, 23-29 November, 1990.
• D. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, in Philosophical Books, Vol. 32 (1991), pp. 163-4.
• P. van Inwagen, Material Beings, in Mind, Vol. 102 (1993), pp. 204-206.
• J. D. Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology, in Philosophical Books, Vol. 34 (1993), pp. 14-16.
• C. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LIV (March, 1994), pp. 237-239.
• H. Putnam, Pragmatism, in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1996), pp. 352-354.
• F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, in Philosophy 72 (1997), pp. 150-154.
• H. Steward, The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States, in The European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1998), pp. 368-372.
• J. Lowe, Subjects of Experience, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), pp. 224-228.
• Stephen Burwood, Paul Gilbert, and Kathleen Lennon, Philosophy of Mind, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), pp. 298-299.
• Bill Brewer, Perception and Reason, in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), pp. 117-9.
• J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi, and A.Varzi, eds., Speaking of Events, in Philosophical Books 43 (2002), pp. 49-52.